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CEO CO 1PENSATION, BACKDATED STOCK OPTIONS, AND COMPENSATION 
COl\ll\IITTEES 
Steve n A. Frankforter, Winthrop Uni ve rs it y 
13re t lk c ton, Uni ve rsit y o f So uthern lvl iss iss ippi 
CEO compensation in U. S. based companies has undergon e considerable scrutiny in recent years. Among th e common 
ohserl'(lfions are that U. S . executives are highly paid relative to those of oth er countries and that th e di~parities in 
compensa tion are in creasing over tim e. In this stttr~l' · H'e investigate th e effec ts that backdated stock options, 
contpensation commi11ee stru cture and process, and ownership fa ctors have on levels of executive compensation. 
Co mbining agency and orgrmi~(l(ional th eory p erspectives, we find CEO compensation positively associated with th e 
presence of backdated stock options, few large-block stockholders, and sm all compensation committees. 
Execut ive co mpensat ion is an intense ly debated and 
researched area . Wi th argument s that CEOs are 
O\'c rcompcnsatcd, wit h prob lemati c accountab ilit y to 
shareho lders, ca lls for re form frequentl y appear in the 
popular press. W1th low acco untab ility to stakeho lders, 
CFO co mpensati on tends to in crease as the firm adopts low-
n ~ k co mpensa ll on schcmc;s (Wcmer, Tos1, & Gomez- Mej ia, 
2005). Further, \\'eak boa1·d comm ittee govemance controls 
may lll lli catc s ituations whereby board o f director 
co mpensati On committees arc co-opted by CEOs, resulting 
111 1nfl a ted compensa ti on (Va feas , 1999), or in in novat ive 
compensat iOn schemes, such as backdated stoc k options 
( I 1e, 2005). 
Accord1n g to age ncy th eo ry, executi ves emp loy pos ition 
power 111 pursuit o f th eir economic sc i !- in teres ts even when 
11 ma y co nfl1 ct \~ 1111 the we lfare o f th eir co rporati ons (J ensen 
& l\1 ec kl1ng, 1976). One remedy to the age ncy problem is to 
usc Interest a li gnment mechan 1sms to lin k CEO 
compen ~at i o n to shJ reho ldcr-bcne fi cial results. A 
commonl y emp loyed app ro ::~ c h IS the awa rdin g o f stock 
opt ions so that CEOs benefit finan c ia ll y when stock pri ces 
esca late . ll owever, in the case o f backdat ed stock opti ons, 
compensati on beco mes guarant eed , instead o r co ntingent on 
fi rm performance. 13 ac kd ating g ua r ::~ nt ccs an o ft en-generous 
pro fit to exccut 1vcs at th e time of iss ue. A second 
component o f age nt contro l is board monitorin g o f CEOs. 
\V 1th director ove rsight , an opport un isti c CEO is sup posed ly 
unable to usurp corpora te asse ts to th eir own bene fit. 
l lowe\'c r. Incenti\'C a li gnment mcc lwni sms :md agent 
mo ni ttm ng by the board ma y int era ct, res ulting in 
comprom1 scd contro ls. Age nt opportuni sm is curbed only 
\\'hen both arc prese nt and effec tua l. For example, if a 
finn' s boa rd uses stock options bu t bo ::~ rd monitoring is 
\leak, executi ves may nw n1pu l ~l t e fi na nc ial info rmati on to 
reap unc:1n1ed finan cial rewards. Such problems \\CIT 
adu1 esscd th rough the adop t ion of til e Sarbancs-Ox Icy Act in 
2002. 
In th is stud y we; cxa m1n c th e effects o f backda ted stock 
op ti Ons, ownership concentrat ion, and compensa ti on 
Ul lllllli ttcc structure and processes on CEO compensati on. 
\\'c dn not assume that all C I-' Os arc overpaid . To the 
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contrary, we ex pect to find higher CEO compensa ti on on ly 
with those firms that empl oy b::tckda ted stock op ti ons and 
whose compensation committee structure and processes 
mi ght be relati vely weak. 
II Y POT III~S ES 
Inquiring into th e determinants o f CEO compensation, 
tile hypotheses will examine one CEO compensa tion 
mcchani . m; backdated stock options. We also include two 
compensati on comn ttee fac tors; th e number of times it 
meets, and its size. Lastl y, we in ves ti ga te two ownership 
fa ctors; the num ber o f large- block owners o f shares, and 
CEO s h ::~ re ownership . 
IJackdat ed S tock Options 
13 Jckda tin g s tock opt ions permits rec ipi ents to selec t a 
da te where the exercise price is low, which in variab ly 
guarant ees a profit as soon as the options are granted. Thi s 
prJctice is wides pread and it h ::~s attracted the prosecutori al 
scru tin y o f the Securities and Exchange Commi ss ion and the 
Justi ce Department. Li e (2005) reported low stock retums 
before co rporate exec uti ve stock opt ion grants and unusuall y 
hi gh returns immed iately aft er. He conclu ded that, unl ess 
executi ves had so me unusual abi lit y to forecast the future, 
they were mo~ t likely backda ting their stock option grants. 
Therefore, we pred ic t th at us ing backdat ed stock options wi ll 
tend to increase CEO compcns:J tion. 
Hypoth esis J. The use o f backda ted stock options 
will be pos iti ve ly assoc iated with CEO 
compensati on. 
T he Numher of Five Percent Ow ners 
When large, concentrated block o f shares are owned by 
:1 significant num ber o f groups or indi viduals, it increases 
th e li kelihood o f oppos ition to po licies and ac ti ons that are 
not in th e interests o f shareholders. II ighl y concentrated 
ownershi p makes it eas ier and re lati vely less ex pensive for 
shareholders to coo rdinate among th emse lves and take 
acti on against firm s they percei ve as not serving shareholder 
wishes (Fa ma & Jensen, 1983 ). Such large-b lock owners 
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avo id firms w ith co rporate govem ance p rob lems. For 
instance, instituti ona l ownership a t compani es whose 
management is suspected o f ent renchment w ill tend to be 
lower (Frankforte r, Bem1an, & Jones, 2000) . Because of the 
difficult o f pro fitabl y se lling large b loc ks of shares without 
making a marke ts price drop , maj or inves to rs w ill tend to 
oppose manageme nt po li c ies no t in the ir bes t in terest ra the r 
than attempt to se ll them . 
Shareho lde rs possess ing s ignifi cant eq uity ho ld in gs 
above a fi ve percent level mu s t ident ify themse lves by 
submitting a sec tion 13(d) filing w it h th e Securit ies and 
Exchange Co mmiss io n. T hese owners may have s ignifi cant 
influence because the bene fit s o f the ir in vo l vemcnt in 
mo nitoring a co mpany's management out weigh the costs 
(Demsetz, 198 3) . Large-b loc k owners have signifi ca nt 
influence over co rpora te po l icy (Demsetz & Lehn , 1985), 
board compos iti o n (Pound, 1992), and he lp ensure that the 
finn 's executi ves ac t to fu rthe r the shareho lder inte res ts 
(Be the l & Liebeskind , 1993). T he g rea te r the number of 
fi ve pe rcent owners, the g rea ter the ir co mb ined ab il ity to 
monito r the fi rm , thus, curbin g agency issues, ho ld ing CEOs 
more accountab le (B rickley, Lease, & S mith , 1988). 
H ypothesis 2 . T he nu mber of fi ve pe rcent own ers 
will be nega ti vely assoc ia ted w ith CEO 
compensa ti o n. 
The Number of C ompen sa tion C o mmittee Meetin gs 
Amo ng the ir o ther duti es in manag ing exec utive 
compensa tion. co rpo ra te co mpensa tion co mmittees 
administe r sha reho lder-app roved stock option p lans_ T hese 
committees de te rmine the size and tim ing of s tock op tio n 
grants. However, it usuall y occurs w ith CEO in vo lvement 
(Lie , 2005) . O ft en, CEOs propose g rant te rms tha t 
compensa ti on co mmit tees a lmost in va ri ab ly ra ti fy 
(Yermack, 1997), providi ng evidence ofCEOs manipul at ion 
of those interes t a li gnment and mo nito ring mechani sms tha t 
might o therw ise tend to curb agency p rob lems. 
Boa rd o f d irec tor rubber-s tamping manageri al dec is ions 
has been an oft-leve led c riti c is m (F le ischer, Hazard , & 
Klipper, 1988) . O ne so luti on is to inc rease the frequency o f 
meetings , a llow ing fo r add itional co llaborati on (iv!cG rath, 
199 1), whi ch can have a pos iti ve impac t on team 
perfom1ance fo r g roups such as boa rds o f directors and its 
committees. An example o f imp roved g roup perfo rmance is 
Va feas ( 1999), who found board meeting frequ ency re la ted 
to firm value. In light o f the evidence, we pred ic t th at 
mee ting frequenc y w ill be in versely re la ted to CEO pa y. 
Hypothesis 3. T he number o f compe nsati o n 
co mmittee meetings w ill be nega ti vely assoc ia ted 
with CEO co mpensa ti on. 
Compensation C ommittee S ize 
Group s ize affects the behavio r o f g roups. tea ms, and 
committees. In genera l. sma ll e r g roups co mp lete tasks more 
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quickly than la rger g roups, and individuals tend to he ighten 
the ir perfo rmance in sma ll groups (Seij ts & La tham, :WOO). 
W hil e thi s ev idence supports small group s ize sma ll in so me 
co ntex ts, o the r empirica l evidence ind ica tes sma ll group size 
may enab le CEOs to manipul3te compensation co mmi ttees 
fo r persona l ga in . Severa l s tud ies im ply that sma lle r groups 
tend to be more coo perative with CEOs and more 
susceptib le to tit - fo r-ta t s trateg ies. An exa mination o f socia l 
d il emm a resea rch reveals that coo perat ion drops as group 
size inc reases (A ll iso n, McQ ueen, & Schaerfl , 1992 ; 
Liebrand. Mess ick, & Wil ke, 1992; Mess ick & Brc\\'er. 
1983, Scij ts & La th am, 2000). T wo possib le ex planations 
fo r this e ffect arc ; ti t-fo r- tat s trategies thJI promote mutua l 
cooperat ion a re less e ffec ti ve with larger g roups, and the 
feeling o f a group member 's sense o f responsibi li ty to the 
group dec reases as its size inc reases (Se ij ts & Latham, 
2000). l ienee, larger gro ups are less like ly to accept the 
s ta tu s quo, ac t in the self- in te res t o f the g roup, and cha ll enge 
dec is ions. 
T hi s s ize o f boards and commi tt ees ha s J lso been the 
subj ect of much resea rch O\'Cr the years. Dai ly and Dalton 
( 1993) found that g rea ter numbers of tota l directo rs to be 
pos iti ve ly assoc iated w it h fi rm perfo rmance . CEO 
dominat ion o f boa rds is mo re di ffi cult as boards inc rease in 
s ize because the re are more po tenti a l opponents to 
manageria l do min ation (Rose nste in, 1987) . Because o f a 
hi gher po tentia l fo r ho mogene it y, group cohes ion, and more 
intense co mm un icati on, small er co mpensa tion co mmittees 
are more like ly to yie ld to CEO wishes, inc reas ing executive 
co mpensation. 
H ypothes is 4 . Compensat ion com mit tee s ize will 
be nega ti ve ly assoc iated with CEO co mpensat ion. 
Share O w ne r ship by th e CEO 
\V hen executi ves have littl e ownership in the firm , they 
have dimi ni shed incenti ves to promote shareholder wea lth. 
and ca n be expected to be more self- serving (J\la lates ta & 
Wa lk! in? 1988). When CEO stock ownership is 
he ightened , a lignm ent wi th the fi nanc ia l interes ts of the firm 
and its shareho lde rs increases (E isenhard t, 1988; Jensen & 
Meck ling, 1976). CEOs possess in g substant ia l eq uity in 
the ir fi m1s ha\'e risk and rewa rd perceptions linked to those 
o f the shareho lde rs , and w ill be more like ly to ac t in the 
shareho lders' interests (Da lton ct a!. , 2003). Higher CEO 
share ownership is associated with reduced instances of 
co mpensa ting executi ves w ith stock optio ns (Brya n, Whang. 
& Lili en, 2000) , d imin ished usc o f go lden parachutes (Si ngh 
& 1-l ::~r i a nt o, 1989), res isting takeove r atte mpts (St ulz, 1988) , 
and adopti ng po iso n p ill takeover defenses (Malates ta & 
Wa lkling, 1988). 
H ypoth es is 5. CEO share ownership wi ll be 
nega ti vely associated w ith CEO c mpensat ion. 
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DES IGN, MEASURES, AND METHODS 
Design 
We se lec ted 166 fim1 s identifi ed by the W a ll S treet 
Jo urna l as be ing under in ves ti ga ti o n fo r employin g 
backd ated stoc k optio ns (Pe rfec t Payday Op tio ns Scorecard . 
W a ll S treet Jo urna l. (O n-line). 
http ://o n line. wsj .com/ public/resources/documents/ info-
o pti onsscore06- full.html) . The finn s so lis ted were subj ect 
to e ither Securiti es and Exc hange Co nuni ss io n and/o r U.S. 
Ju sti ce Department investi gati o n. Whi le the fo rn1 and 
c ircumstances fo r in ves ti ga tio ns varied , we cons ide red the 
initia ti on o f a federa l inves ti ga ti o n a s ignifi cant s ig n that 
wrongdo ing may have occutTed . According ly, we decided 
that named co mpani es mi ght be pro ne to agency probl ems 
a nd corpo ra te governance issues. We de fin ed the cont ro l 
g ro up as firm s w ithin the sa me indus tri es tha t we re no t 
unde r such in ves ti ga ti o n. We employed case-co ntro l 
p rocedures descri bed by Seabright , Levintha l, and Fichman 
( 1992). Case-contro l des igns exam ine re la ti ve ly ra re events. 
Com pa ny s ize wa s se lec ted as a ma tching va ri abl e because it 
could po tenti a lly confo und res ults, beca use CEO 
co mpensa ti o n tends to inc rease w ith the s ize o f the firm . 
T he re fo re, we se lec ted the two co ntro l group firm s nea res t in 
to ta l assets w ithin the sa me 2-di g it S ICs to each firm in the 
ex pe ri ment a l g ro up (S ingh & Ha ri anto, 1989). The result 
was the initia l se lec ti o n o f 332 co ntro l firm s. T he reaso n we 
se lec ted a gene ro u ~ number o f co ntro l firm s wa s beca use we 
anti c ipa ted tha t the use of multi p le dat a sources wo uld resul t 
in a s ignifi ca nt reduc ti o n o f fi rms re maini ng fo r s tati stica l 
ana lys is beca use o f mi ssi ng da ta . T his des ign a ll ows us to 
mo re c lea nl y in ves ti ga te pheno mena beca use we are no t 
se lec ting o r so rting firm s acco rd in g to th e depend ent 
vari3b lc (CEO co mpensa ti o n). 
M iss ing o r inco mple te proxy s tatemen t da t3 red uced the 
number o f co mpani es by I 39. Five fi rms lacked Resea rch 
Ins ight da ta . Fina ll y , we e limin3ted I 3 I co mp:lll ics d ue to 
m iss in o CEO co mpensa ti o n da ta. T hus, the number of firm s 
in o ur ; tud y was reduced to 223; 73 were in the ex perimenta l 
g ro up and 150 in the co ntro l g ro up. We perfo rm ed a t- tes t to 
dc tc rn1ine w he the r asse t s ize d iffe red between the gro ups 
and found an ins igni fi cant !-s ta ti s ti c o f .OJ. Acco rd ing ly, we 
co nc luded the finn s remai n ing in o ur s tud y were of s imi lar 
s ize. W e se lected 2000 as the exam in a ti o n yea r because 
backda ted opti o ns were in va ri ab ly e nac ted befo re thi s date. 
Fu rthermo re, the passage o f the Sa rb3 ncs Ox ley Ac t in 2002 
g rea tl y dim in ished the freq uency o f bac kda ted s tock o ptio ns 
and a lso led to w idespread changes in boa rd struc tures and 
processes th at wo ul d like ly c l ud o ur inves ti ga ti o n. 
l\1ca sures a nd Method s 
T he in dcp(' ndent va ri a ble was CEO to ta l co mpensati on. 
The dependent va riables were the presence of b3ckda ted 
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stock op ti ons, the number o f co mpensation comm ittee 
mee tings and the s ize o f the committee , the number of large-
block owners, and the pro po rti o n o f the firm's shares the 
CEO owned. 
We introduced two co ntro l va riab les ; firm s ize ( log o f 
empl oyees) , and re turn o n equit y. Fi rm s ize may influence 
the fo nn o f power and govem ance s tructures. For examp le , 
Finke lste in and D ' Aveni ( 1994) re po rted that organi zati on 
s ize tended to affect the usc o f dua l s truc tures, the power of 
its executi ves, and firm perfonn ance. We co ntro lled for firm 
s ize by co mputin g the log o f the to ta l number o f emplo yees 
(Frankfo rt er, Dav is, & Vo llra th , 200 I ) to reduce 
he teroscedas ti c ity (Ke rlingcr, 19 73) . 
N ex t, the re a re links be tween pro fitabilit y and 
govem ance s truc ture. Directo rs o f unde rperfonning firm s 
exerc ise the ir autho rit y mo re readi ly , ho lding management 
to he ighte ned standa rds o f account a bi lit y (A lderfer , 1986; 
Mi zruchi , 1983). Da vis, Schoonnan, and Dona ldson ( 199 7) 
pred ic ted th at firm s with hi g h degrees o f a li gnment be tween 
the CEO philosoph y a nd the firm 's governance structure 
would tend to have hi ghe r p ro fits. W e measured 
pro fi tab ilit y as the firm 's re turn o n equit y. 
W e o bta ined tota l CEO co mpe nsati o n from 
ExecuCo mp, de fin ed as the sum o f sa la ry, bo nus, o the r 
annu a l co mpensati on to ta l va lue o f restric ted stoc k granted , 
to ta l va lue o f stock o p ti o ns g ranted , lo ng- te rm incenti ve 
payouts, and a ll o the r to ta l co mpe nsa ti on. Firm s ize and 
re turn o n eq uit y da ta were o b tai ned from Resea rch lns1ght. 
A ll o ther da ta we re co ll ected fro m proxy s ta tements. W e 
e mployed multipl e regressio n ana lys is to tes t our mode l. 
R ESU LTS 
Tab le 1 repo rts desc ri p ti ve s tati s ti cs, va ri atio n infl ati o n 
f::t c to rs, and the co rre la ti o n m3tr ix . We addressed 
muti co llincarit y co ncerns by exa mining co rre lati ons and 
va ri ati o n infl a ti o n fa c to rs. N o co rre lati o n coe ffi c ie nt 
exceeded .30 . Ad d iti ona ll y, none o f the vari a ti on infl ation 
fa c to rs s urpassed 1. 18 , fa r fro m the c ritica l limit o f 10 
(N etter, W asserman, & Kutne r, 1989) These result s 
suppo rted o ur conc lus io n th a t muti co llinearit y did not 
threa ten to contamina te o ur result s. 
Tab le 2 d isp lays the descri pti ve st3ti s ti cs and mu lti pl e 
regressio n resu lts. O ur mode l revea ls s ignifi ca nt ma in 
effec ts fo r the use of backd a ted s tock o pti ons, the number o f 
five percent owners, and co mmitt ee s ize on to ta l CEO 
compensa ti o n. Ho wever, the res ult fo r the number o f . 
compensa ti o n co mmittee meetings was pos iti vely assoc tated 
w ith CEO co mpensati o n, w hi ch was in the o ppos ite 
directi o n to tha t w hi c h was predi c ted . There fo re, hypo theses 
1 2 and 4 were suppo rted . I lowever, hypo theses 3 and 5 
,~e re no t suppo rt ed . Overa ll , o ur mode l had good predi c ti ve 
va lue, w ith a s ignificant F= 3.79 (p < .00 1) and an adjus ted 
R2 = .08 . 
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Table 1: Descriptive S tat istics, Variation Infl a ti on Fac to r s (V IFs), a nd t he C on-elatio n Matrix 
Mean S. D. VI F 2 3 
I. CEO I 0529 .06 4209 .66 
co mpensati on 
2. Backdated s toc k .33 47 1.08 . 10 
options 
3. Number o f fi ve 2.45 14 8 1.03 -. 15* .06 
percent owners 
4. Committee s ize 3.09 .96 I . 18 -.07 -.2 1 ** -09 
5. Co mmittee 3.46 2.5 4 I. 14 .22*** -. 17** -. 10 
meetings 
6. CEO ownership .04 .07 I. I I -.02 .07 . 12 
7. Firm s ize .64 .68 1.1 2 . 10 -.08 -.08 
8 . Return on equity 8.33 85.27 1.0 I .0 1 -.OJ - 03 
4 5 6 7 8 
4 . Co mmittee size 
5. Co mmittee . 16* 
meetings 
6. CEO ownershi p 17* -.27* ** 
7. Firm s ize .30*** . 15* - 06 
8. Return on equit y .00 .04 - 0 I .08 
* p < .05 
**p <. Ol 
*** p < .00 1 
Tab le 2 : l\1ultiplc Reg ress ion R es ults 
Va ri ables 
Cons tant 
Backda ted stock opt ions 
Number of fi ve pe rcent owners 
Co mmittee s ize 
Co mmittee meetings 
CEO ownership 
Firm s ize 
Re turn on equit y 
F 
Adjusted R2 
* p < .05 
**p <. OI 
*** p < .001 
With the pro life ra ti o n o f co mmittees in corporate 
governance struc tures, increased attenti ons shoul d be 
directed towards the conditi ons under whi ch they function. 
O ne mi ght ask: a re the board committees e ffectu a l, or a re 
they beneath the purview o f shareholde rs to the po int 
whereby CEO opp01tuni sm might be concea led') The 
finding tha t firm s with higher exec uti ve co mpensa ti on w::ts 
linked to firm s us ing backda ted stock options, hav ing few 




. 14 2 06* 
-. 15 -2.29* 
-. 12 - 178* 
.24 3.55*** 
.03 .4 1 
. 11 1.59 
-.02 - .26 
J. 79* ** 
.08 
committees prov id es good evidence o f agency problems 
embedded in firm s and the ir situa ti ons. We surmise that 
ineffec tua l s truc ture and process a t the co mmittee leve l may 
th wa rt a ttempt s to exerc ise co nt ro l over opportuni stic CEOs. 
resulting in e nhanced CEO co mpensa ti on and dimini shed 
monit o ring, rega rdl ess of the firm ·s perforntancc. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Altho ugh agency theo ry and executi ve co mpensatio n 
have bo th been we ll -researched in recent yea rs, the literature 
has large ly igno red behavio ra l theo ry, espec ia ll y concerning 
the co mpos iti o n and structure o f co mpensa ti o n co mmittees. 
T hi s s tudy co ntributes to the und ers tand ing o f co rporat e 
governa nce b y exa mining a va rie ty of poss ib le antecedents 
to C EO co mpensa ti o n, inco rpo rating a behavio rall y-ori ented 
pe rspecti ve . The results o f thi s study prov ide important 
ev idence co ncerning w hi ch fac to rs o r s ituations contribute 
the overco mpensa tion o f CEOs, w hic h w ill be instlllc ti ve in 
des ig ning remedi es in the future . 
Whil e agency theory has been o ne o f the most dominant 
manageme nt theo ries over the pas t few decades, littl e 
empiri ca l evide nce suppo rts its va li d ity , often yie lding 
mi xed and/o r co nfus ing res ults. Fo r exa mpl e, w hil e 
E isenh ard t 's ( 1988 ) a rg ued th at agency and ins tituti onal 
theori es we re bo th empiri ca ll y va li d pe rspecti ves, many 
o the r resea rchers arg ue tha t agency theory has littl e 
ex p lana to ry power. Da lto n e t a l. (2003) co nduc ted a me ta-
ana lys is o f empiri ca l ownership- pe rfo rmance studi es, 
find in g few exa mp les o f syste mic re la ti o nships and littl e 
suppo rt fo r agency theo ry. In contrast to the o bj ec ti ons to 
the va lue o f agency theo ry, we fo und s ig nifi cant results with 
rega rd to unde rs tanding the co nditi ons unde r w hi ch agency 
pro b lems mi ght be pro mul ga ted . 
O ur a pproac h was to first assum e th at age ncy prob le ms 
were e ithe r ra re, o r d iffi cult to uncover. Thi s prompted us to 
in ves ti ga te a se t o f firm s w ith a good prima fa c ie case fo r 
agency prob lems- the use o f backda ted stoc k o pti o ns. 
Additio na ll y, we o bserved tha t researche rs us ing agency 
theo ry o fte n lac ked a behavio ra l theo re ti ca l pe rspecti ve, 
limiti ng the ir s ability to effec ti ve ly in ves ti ga te g ro up , 
mo tiva ti o na l, a nd behavio ra l issues. We co nc luded that 
agency theo ry mi ght be bes t tes ted e mpiri ca ll y w hen link ed 
to be havi o ra ll y-o riented theo ri es . 
Direc to r coopta ti o n does no t necessa ril y occ ur at the 
board leve l. lt can be achi eved thro ug h the lll anipul a ti o n o f 
co mmi tt ee s truc ture and process. W hil e boJrd -leve l 
va ri ab les may appear sound , co mmittee va ri ables a re much 
less o bservab le and may be m o re pro ne to CEO 
m anipu la ti o n. The results o f thi s s tu dy revea l tha t firm s 
having sma ll co mpensat io n co mmittees inc rease the 
li ke lihood o f overco mpensa tin g C EOs. A a result , 
corpo ra ti o ns o ught to s ta ff co mpensati o n co mmittees w ith 
mo re me mbers. 
A ltho ugh severa l s teps were taken to lessen the e ffec ts 
o f commo n me thod variance and measurement e1To r, these 
findin gs a nd impl ica ti o ns sho uld be int e rpre ted in li s ht o f 
the lim itati o ns o f our s tud y. W e recogni ze tha t the data in 
th is stud y a rc c ross -secti ona l in nature. A lthough we 
e mp loyed co ntro l va riab les, it is poss ib le tha t a lternati ve 
reasons fo r the resultin g e ffec ts ex ist. Future resea rch o f a 
more lo ng itudina l na ture sho uld be co nduc ted to detem1ine 
if these e ffec ts change ac ross t ime in the sa me o rgani za tio ns . 
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